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1. INTRODUCTION 
The trend toward a highly mobile workforce and the ubiquity of 
graphical interfaces (such as the stylus and touch-screen) has 
enabled the emergence of graphical authentications in Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDAs) [1]. However, most of the current 
graphical password schemes are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing 
[2,3], a known risk where an attacker can capture a password by 
direct observation or by recording the authentication session. 
Several approaches have been developed to deal with this 
problem, but they have significant usability drawbacks, usually in 
the time and effort to log in, making them less suitable for 
authentication [4, 8]. For example, it is time-consuming for users 
to log in CHC [4] and there are complex text memory 
requirements in scheme proposed by Hong [5]. With respect to 
the scheme proposed by Weinshall [6], not only is it intricate to 
log in, but also the main claim of resisting shoulder-surfing is 
proven false [7]. In this paper, we introduce a new graphical 
password scheme which provides a good resistance to shoulder-
surfing and preserves a desirable usability. 
The proposed shoulder-surfing resistant scheme CDS (Come from 
DAS and Story) inspired by two representative graphical 
password schemes: DAS [2] and Story [3]. DAS allows users to 
draw a free-form picture on N×N grid to produce a password [2] 
and Story requires users to select a sequence of images to make a 
story [3]. CDS adopts a similar drawing input method in DAS and 
inherits the association mnemonics in Story for sequence retrieval. 
It requires users to draw a curve across their password images 
orderly rather than click directly on them. The drawing passes 
through both password images and decoys, which used to confuse 
peepers. To avoid revealing the first and last pass-images, the 
drawing must begin and end with given random images. Other 
complementary measures, such as displaying the degraded images, 
limiting the length of drawing trace, and erasing the drawing trace 
are also deployed to strengthen the security. 
A preliminary user study was carried to explore the usability of 
CDS. The result was encouraging that users were able to enter 
their passwords in 13.7 seconds on average, which is a good result 
comparing to other recognition based schemes. In comparison to 
Story, our scheme had a similar memorability, probably due to the 
same association mnemonics.  
2. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
The proposed scheme keeps most of the advantage of Story and 
achieves stronger security. Like Story, our scheme is based on 
recognition, and suggests users to create a story for sequence 
retrieval. Instead of direct input, it depends on users drawing a 
curve across their password images (pass-images) in order.  
The scheme uses a set of images gathered from 
http://images.google.com. The images covering objects, places 
and people are carefully selected to motivate users’ imagination 
and resized to have identical aspect ratios. To create a password, a 
user orderly chooses several images from the set as his/her pass-
images. The user can remember the connection between the pass-
images by mentally constructing a story. For confirmation, the 
user should draw a curve to cross his/her pass-images in right 
order without lifting the stylus from the drawing surface.  
 
Figure 1. A possible drawing trace with length 19. 
During the authentication phase, a degraded version of images is 
randomly displayed on the screen. These degraded images are 
formed by increasing brightness and reducing contrast of the 
original images. User must recognize his/her degraded pass-
images and draw a curve to orderly cross them. The curve thus 
passes through both pass-images and other random images used to 
confuse the attacker. To avoid revealing pass-images (considering 
a user usually starts with the first pass-image and ends with the 
last), the drawing must begin with a given random image (head 
image) determined by the system and end likewise with another 
(tail image). Moreover, the majority of the drawing trace will be 
cleared away as the stylus being sliding and only the tail part will 
be kept to show the current location of the stylus.  
Figure 1 shows the interface of the scheme, which uses a template 
of 24 identically sized images, grouped into a 4×6 matrix. A 
possible drawing to log in the scheme is shown in figure where 
the head is labeled by red rectangle and the tail green. 
The trace length measured in the number of images crossed is 
limited within a tolerance in view of the random guess and brute 
force attacks. The tolerance is adjustable and roughly defined by 
the maximum length of drawing trace L  in our prototype. In 
default, the maximum length of drawing trace L is defined in 
terms of the number of images in width w and in length l as well 
as the number of pass-images n by: )1()( +⋅+= nlwL . 
Therefore, L=(4+6)×(5+1)=60 in Figure 1.  
3. PRELIMINARY USER STUDY 
To discuss the usability of CDS, twenty university students are 
invited to the study. We conducted a between-subjects design to 
benchmark the usability against that of Story [3]. Half of the 
subjects were assigned to the CDS group and half to the Story 
group. For both group, each participant was required to select five 
images as his/her pass-images to the purpose of comparing the 
between group using time. 
In CDS group, seven of the participants accomplished the 
criterion in ten attempts with no errors. The other three 
participants made a total of four incorrect logins. The mean 
success login rate is 96.5% (Standard Deviation, StdDev=5.98). 
In Story group, eight participants made no mistake in ten login 
attempts and each of the other made one incorrect login. The 
mean success rate is 98.2% (StdDev=3.83), higher than that of 
CDS group. However, it is useful to note that in practical terms, 
this was only a difference of two incorrect responses and should 
be treated with caution. 
The mean time for correct password inputs was also analyzed. As 
shown in Table 1, the participants in CDS group took more time 
to log in than their counterparts in Story group on average (13.7s 
vs. 9.2s). A t-test yields a result of t=3.91, p<0.01(two tails), 
indicating that there was statistically significant difference 
between two conditions. 
Table 1. Login time (seconds) for all correct inputs 
Group Avg. t-test S.d. Max Min
CDS 13.7 5.97 45 7 
Story 9.2 P<0.01 4.26 32 4 
 
Both groups kept a downward trend in time to input the password 
and the trend in CDS group looked more salient. Moreover, the 
difference between two groups became more and more slight. For 
CDS group, an F-test (one tail) yields a result of F=4.11, p<0.01, 
showing a significant decrease in time to input the password over 
the ten logins. For the Story group, the result of F-test (one tail) 
indicated that there were no significant differences over the ten 
logins. It can be concluded that users will become adroit at CDS 
with frequent use. 
4. COUCLUSIONS 
A new shoulder-surfing resistant scheme CDS was proposed in 
this paper. It adopts a visual login technique that matches the 
capabilities and limitations of most handheld devices and provides 
a simple and intuitive way for users to authenticate on PDAs. The 
main contribution is that it overcomes a drawback of recall-based 
systems by erasing the drawing trace and introduces the drawing 
method to a variant of Story to resist shoulder-surfing. 
Preliminary usability testing of the CDS scheme showed that 
users were able to enter their passwords accurately. It took 
participants about 13.7 seconds to log in CDS at average and 
there was a gentle downward trend in time to input the password. 
The login time was not as good as Story and the degraded images 
in CDS were most likely to impinge on its efficiency. 
Further work includes reducing the login time, finding a proper 
tolerance for the drawing trace length, and conducting a large 
scale user study. We also plan to investigate the entropy issue of 
pass-images and to study in more depth the effect of the 
association mnemonics on graphical passwords. 
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